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CAMILLE HENRIE GATES,
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000O000
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000O000

REPLY TO RESPONDENTS "STATEMENT OF FACTS"
Plaintiff is concerned about several representations in
Respondents brief which are made as "Statement of Fact" but
which are actually arguments for Respondent's position rather
than true factual representations.
Paragraph 14 of Respondent's "Statement of Facts"
simply is not an accurate statement of facts as represented.
Contrary to the indications therein, Plaintiff testified that he
specifically informed Defendant "around October" of 1985 that his
income had

significantly

increased

1

to

"about

$5,000.00 to

$6,000.00 a month."

[Transcript: page 72, line 16 through 19.]

Appellant further testified that he continued to discuss his
increase

in income through January

of 1986 and thereafter.

[Transcript: page 72, line 20 through page 73, line 3.]
Respondent

to

represent

that

"the

Defendant

For

provided

no

information regarding his income at the time the parties entered
into the Stipulation
providing

either by a verbal

any documentation

of his

affirmation

income"

or by

is simply

a

misrepresentation and an attempt to take improper license where
supposedly setting out to the Court accepted
Fact".

"Statements of

Respondent was informed at the time of the Stipulation

that Appellant's income had significantly increased and that the
increase in income was the reason why Appellant was willing to
raise child support by stipulation in excess of that earlier
ordered by the Court.
Like paragraph 14 of Respondent's Statement of Facts,
paragraph 16 simply misstates an accepted fact in the case.
Respondent alleges in her Brief that Exhibit "24" was "admitted
... to show the disparity between what Plaintiff claimed as
income at the time of trial in July, 1985 and his actual income
as shown on his 1985 tax return."

The citation provided to the

Court would seem to support that allegation.

The next five lines

of the transcript following that citation, however, clearly show
that the Court corrected that indication and clarified that

2

Exhibit "24" was not intended to show income during July of 1985
but rather was "based on '84 income."
24 through

25.]

This

[Transcript: page 54, line

is a critical misrepresentation

Respondent which continues throughout her brief.

by

Respondent

attempts continually to represent to this Court that Appellant
misrepresented his income in July of 1985.

She does so by using

a year-end tax return for the year 1985 which simply averages
Appellant's income over that year between the low figure earned
in July of 1985 (at the time of the prior hearing before the
Court) and the high figure during the fall and winter months of
1985 (long after the hearing before the Court).
Appellant clearly and concisely testified that in July
of 1985 (at the time of previous hearing before the Trial Court)
he was earning approximately $2,131.58 per month as set out in
Plaintiff's Exhibit "25" and that his income significantly
increased in October and thereafter of 1985 to approximately
$6,000.00 per month.
73, line 13.]

[Transcript: page 71, line 5 through page

Using those facts out of context, Respondent has

attempted to average Plaintiff's income throughout the year 1985
in an attempt to argue before this Court (and the Trial Court)
that Appellant misrepresented his income in July of 1985.

Such

an attempt is clearly improper and not factual.
Respondent compounds her attempt at

inaccurately

stating fact in paragraph 17 when Respondent properly points out

3

that the Order entered in January 1986 "was not an accurate
statement of the Plaintiff's income at 'that time'.11

It was not

intended to reflect Plaintiff's income at "that time" but rather
was clearly and properly intended to reflect Plaintiff's income
as of the court hearing in July of 1985 and it clearly so states.
It did in fact accurately reflect the Plaintiff's income as of
July 1985 and there is no evidence whatsoever in the record to
indicate otherwise.
misrepresented

his

In other words,
income

to

the

Plaintiff at no time

Court

in July

1985

or

thereafter.
In paragraph 19 of Respondent's supposed "Statement of
Facts" Respondent again mischaracterizes the clear facts by
indicating that "the Plaintiff at no time disclosed his income to
the Defendant when the parties entered into the Stipulation to
increase child support."

The Court is referred to the clear and

concise testimony otherwise as referred to hereinabove.
Respondent properly makes a statement

of fact in

paragraph 20 but attempts to draw a mischaracterized conclusion
therefrom.

Respondent does factually state that her counsel was

not involved in the negotiations which resulted in the increase
in child support in the fall of 1985.

In fact,

only the

Plaintiff

involved

in those

and

negotiations.

Defendant themselves were

Respondent attempts, in her brief, however, to

infer that the absence of discovery or direct involvement of her

4

counsel was at the behest of or an attempt by Plaintiff to
misrepresent certain facts to her.

On the contrary, Plaintiff

clearly testified that he informed Defendant of his increase in
income and his resulting willingness to pay additional child
support which in and of itself resulted in the Stipulation to
increase child support significantly over that previously ordered
by the Court.
paragraph
pleadings

Respondent continues the improper inference in

21 stating that Defendant's Motion to modify
to

conform

to

the

evidence

were

"based

the
upon

misrepresentations to the Court, misrepresentations to the
Defendant and material omissions of fact by the Plaintiff.11
Nothing could be further from the truth.

Plaintiff made no

misrepresentations to the Court, to Defendant or to anyone else
at any time and to state otherwise as a "Statement of Fact" is
clearly misleading and improper.
Respondent

further attempts to mischaracterize

the

facts surrounding the Stipulation by omitting to indicate that
both parties were represented by counsel at all times and that
counsel for both parties were fully involved in drafting and
preparing

the

Stipulation

respective clients.

itself

for

signature

by

their

The Stipulation went through several drafts

in order to contain specific language acceptable to both parties
and their counsel.

5

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN ITS EQUITABLE
POWERS WHEN IT RAISED CHILD SUPPORT AND A
RETROACTIVE AWARD FOR INCREASED CHILD SUPPORT
WOULD LIKEWISE BE IMPROPER
Appellant does not disagree in principle with the

"Principles of Review" or the "Utah Legal Principles Regarding
Child Support" as set out in Point I, sub-points A, and B. of
Respondent's Brief.

Those principles do not, however, support

the conclusion drawn by Respondent that the Court's increase in
child support is an appropriate exercise of its equitable powers.
The contrary is in fact true.

Both case law and legal principles

require that, where no substantial change of circumstances has
occurred, the Court has no equitable power to modify a child
support award.

The Trial Court in the case at bar specifically

and uncontradictingly

found that no substantial

change

in

circumstances had occurred and, as a result thereof, improperly
modified the child support award.

This Court is referred to the

case law set out in Appellant's principal brief in this matter
which will not be repeated hereat.
Respondent goes further in the arguments in her brief
before this Court in an attempt to allege that the Trial Court
"should have increased the child support and made it retroactive
to January,
month".

1986 when Mr.

Gates began making $6,000.00 per

Such a request is neither justified nor proper before

this Court.

A claim for retroactive child support was not made
6

before the Trial Court and is not proper to be raised for the
first time upon appeal.

See Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep.

17 (Utah 1989) wherein the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
cites the well settled principle that "we have held that in the
absence of exceptional circumstances,

this court will not

entertain a claim raised for the first time on appeal."
19.

Id. at

See also B.N.H.. In re, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1989)

and State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987).
Not

only

is Respondent's

claim

in

this

regard

improperly raised for the first time on appeal, but the facts of
the case clearly show no merit to the claim.

The Stipulation

entered into by and between the parties in April of 1986 states
unequivocally that "the parties acknowledge that this Stipulation
" . . . is based upon circumstances of each
party as they presently exist and, subject to
the Court's approval, the Divorce Decree and
subsequent orders may be modified upon this
Stipulation and subject to its terms being
incorporated therein." [Emphasis added]
At the time of entering into the Stipulation between the parties,
Appellant was making the $6,000.00 per month income referred to
by Respondent

in her brief.

Clearly,

therefore,

those

circumstances existed at the time of the Stipulation and are not
subject to a retroactive child support order.
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II.

RESPONDENT'S CLAIM OF ERROR BY THE TRIAL COURT IN
AWARDING MR. GATES THE TAX EXEMPTION FOR THE
PARTIES' MINOR CHILD IS CLEARLY NOT WELL TAKEN
Like

support,

Respondent's

Respondent's

request

claim

that

for

retroactive

the Trial

Court

child

erred

in

awarding Mr. Gates the tax exemption for the parties 7 minor child
is raised
neither

for the first time in Respondent's Brief.

raised

significance,

in

the

Trial

did Respondent

Court

appeal

nor,

of

It was

perhaps

more

from that decision

in a

timely fashion before this Court.

As such, Respondent is clearly

barred

for

from

raising

the

same

the

first

time

in

her

Respondent's Brief.
Of perhaps more importance, however, is the fact that
Respondent's claim is simply wrong under the principles of law
adopted by and stated by this Court.

This Court is specifically

referred to its opinion in the case of Motes v. Motes, 121 Utah
Adv.

Rep.

50

(Utah

1989)

wherein

the

court

clearly

and

unequivocally stated, after considering exactly the arguments put
forth by Respondent in her brief that,
we conclude the 1984 amendment to
Section 152 does not divest state courts of
their traditional power to allocate federal
tax dependency exemptions, and state courts
have the power to order a custodial parent to
execute a declaration in favor of the
non-custodial parent. The contrary position
followed by only a minority of jurisdictions
was not intended by Congress, especially given
the lack of an expressed termination of the
traditional approach of state courts to
dependency-exemption allocation. Finally, the
practical effect of a contrary ruling would
8

essentially prevent state courts from taking
permissible advantage of progressive tax
brackets and maximizing the resources
available to support divorcing parents and
their families. [Emphasis added] Id. at 55.
The Trial Court properly continued the exemption for
the parties7 minor child in favor of Appellant in light of the
traditional equitable principles considered in such a decision
but also due to the fact that the parties themselves had so
stipulated in the April 10, 1986 Stipulation from which the court
found there had been no material change in circumstances.
Respondent's raising of said issue in this appeal is without
merit and is frivolous.
III.

THE COURT SHOULD AWARD APPELLANT COSTS AND REASONABLE
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR PROSECUTING THIS APPEAL
Appellant has argued in his main brief that this Court

should set aside the award of attorney's fees made by the Trial
Court in favor of Respondent and that this Court should in fact
award Appellant his attorney's

fees in connection with the

proceedings in the Trial Court.

For those same reasons as well

as the reasons and principles set out in Respondent's Brief in
Point IV, this Court should likewise award Appellant his costs
and a reasonable attorney's fee for the prosecution of this
appeal.

9

CONCLUSION
The Trial

Court was clearly

not

acting

equitable powers when it raised child support

within

its

in light of a

finding of no material change of circumstances and where there
was

no

misrepresentation

of

any

kind.

Likewise,

any

consideration of a retroactive award for increased child support
would clearly be improper at this stage of the proceedings.
The Trial Court acted well within its discretion in
awarding the continuing tax exemption for the minor child to
Appellant.
This Court should set aside the Trial Court's award of
attorneys' fees to Respondent below and should award Appellant
reasonable attorneys' fees for the proceedings below and for the
prosecution of this Appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of December, 1989.
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